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Abstract 
In this paper, I first summarize how the US Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) operates 
and describe the characteristics of recipients. I then discuss empirical work on the 
effects of the EITC on poverty and income distribution, and its effects on labor supply. 
Next, I discuss a few policy concerns about the EITC: possible negative effects on hours 
of work and marriage, and problems of compliance with the tax system. I then briefly 
discuss some possible reforms to the structure of the current EITC. 
Keywords: Welfare reform, Earned income tax credit, EITC, Earnings subsidies, Tax 
credits, Poverty 
JEL-codes: D31, H24, I38, J38 
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2  IFAU –The US earned income tax credit, its effects, and possible reforms Since its inception in 1975, the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) has grown 
dramatically in size and is now the largest anti-poverty program for the non-aged in the 
United States. In 2003, 22 million families received EITC payments totaling 
USD 38.7 billion.
1 As a result, the EITC lifted 3.7 million individuals above the poverty 
line. In addition to directly raising incomes, the EITC has sharply changed work 
incentives, increasing the after-tax wage by up to forty percent for those with low 
earnings. The EITC is part of the tax system and does not require people to have a tax 
liability that the credit offsets. A person without a net tax liability receives it as a 
payment that, by 2007, could be as large as USD 4,716. The fundamental problem in 
designing tax and transfer programs to those with few resources is that such programs 
undermine work effort. The goal of the EITC has been to transfer income while 
encouraging work. This feature led to the political support for its initial adoption and for 
its subsequent expansions (Liebman 1998, Ventry 2001). The program has taken on 
increased prominence in recent years as policy makers have sought to reduce the 
dependence encouraged by welfare programs.  
1  How the EITC works 
The EITC provides an earnings subsidy to family members who satisfy three criteria. 
First, a family must have a wage earner, since only those who work are eligible. Second, 
the family must have low income. In 2007, a family with one child can receive the 
EITC if its income is below USD 33,241, while a family with two children can earn up 
to USD 37,783 and receive a credit.
2 Third, while a small EITC (up to USD 428 in 
2007) is available to the childless, to receive a significant EITC, a family has to have 
resident children. The maximum credit for a family with one child is USD 2,853 in 
2007, while that for a family with two or more children is USD 4,716. Since the EITC is 
refundable, a family can receive the credit even if they do not have an income tax 
liability. In the vast majority of cases, the credit is received as a lump sum as part of a 
                                                 
1 Seventeen percent of those filing tax returns received the EITC. 
2 Beginning in 2002, a married couple could have income USD 1,000 higher than a single parent family and still 
receive a tax credit. This was changed to USD 2,000 starting with tax year 2005. 
IFAU – The US earned income tax credit, its effects, and possible reforms  3 tax refund early the following year. The tax filer must fill out a one page form, with 
information on the qualifying child or children, that is submitted with the rest of the tax 
return. In summary, the credit subsidizes work by poor parents as it transfers income to 
them. 
The EITC schedule for families with children in 2007 is shown in Figure 1. The top 
schedule, for families with two or more children, provides a larger credit at all income 
levels than that for one-child families, shown underneath. Both schedules provide a 
large earnings subsidy initially as the credit is phased in: forty cents for each dollar 
earned for the first USD 11,790 in earnings for those with two or more children. For 
example, a single mother with two children who earned USD 10,000 would receive a 
credit of USD 4,000. In the flat, or plateau part of the schedule, the total credit received 
does not change with earnings. With additional earnings beyond the plateau, however, 
the credit is decreased in the phase-out region, resulting in an implicit tax on earnings at 
a rate just over 21 percent for those with two or more children. For those with one child 
there are somewhat lower earnings subsidies, credits and implicit taxes.  
Figure 1 Federal earned income tax credit schedule for single parent families with 






















4  IFAU –The US earned income tax credit, its effects, and possible reforms 2  Who receives the EITC? 
While eligibility for the EITC does not explicitly select single mothers, the income 
ranges and the dependence on children leads the credit to implicitly target single 
mothers. To paint a statistical portrait of recipients, we examine their characteristics 
from several angles and with two data sets. The two sources of data do not perfectly 
agree, but they lead to roughly similar conclusions. Table 1 is calculated from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS), the largest in-depth survey of the economic status of 
American households. Based on data for 2004, the table suggests that nearly 40 percent 
of EITC dollars go to single mothers. Adding in single fathers, one can see that nearly 
half (49 percent) of EITC dollars go to single parents. Since poor families with children 
are disproportionately headed by single parents, such families receive a large share of 
EITC payments. The vast majority of remaining dollars go to married couples with 
children, who receive 46 percent of the credit dollars. While a substantial number of 
recipient couples or individuals are childless (24 percent), they only receive 6 percent of 
the credit dollars. This concentration of 94 percent of EITC dollars in families with 
children reflects the program design to provide larger credits to these families.  
Table 2 reports demographic characteristics of EITC recipients with children, by 
marital status. The characteristics of non-recipients with children are reported for 
comparison. Single recipients with children are fairly similar to single non-recipients 
with children, except they are slightly older, less educated (particularly less likely to 
have a college degree), and have more children, but fewer young children. That 
recipients are older and have fewer young children partly reflects that one must work to 
receive the EITC. Married recipients are much less educated, and more likely to be 
black. Nevertheless, the vast majority of EITC recipients are white.  
 










Single women with children     
Total benefit  $10,735  41.09  $2,066 
Number of individuals  5.197  31.32   
Single men with children     
Total benefit   $1,948  7.46  $1,627 
Number of individuals  1.198  7.22   
Married couples with children     
Total benefit  $11,980  45.86  $2,084 
Number of individuals  5.747  34.64   
Individuals without qualifying child     
Total benefit  $1,362  5.21  $349 
Number of individuals  3.903  23.52   
Couples without qualifying child     
Total benefit  $98  0.37  $178 
Number of individuals  0.548  3.30   
Total      
Total benefit  $26,122  100.00  $1,574 
Number of individuals  16.592  100.00   
Source: Author’s calculation using data from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement 2005. All numbers 
are weighted. 
 
Table 2 Demographic characteristics of EITC recipients, 2004 




 Single  Married  Single  Married 
Average age (years) 37.6  38.8  35.2  39.4 
Educational attainment (percentage) 
High school dropout  17.5 31.3 18.6  8.6 
High school graduate  39.2 37.0 31.3 26.9 
Some  college  33.9 21.7 31.5 28.5 
College graduate  9.4  10.0  18.7  35.9 
Black (percentage)  22.1 9.3 21.0 5.7 
Average number of children, by age 
0 to 5 years old  0.386  0.672  0.585  0.595 
Six to 17 years old 1.216  1.251  0.989  1.313 
Total 1.602  1.924  1.574  1.909 
Source: Author’s calculation using data from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement 2005. All numbers 
are weighted. 
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By filing status of recipient 
 
      
Head of household        
Total benefit  $28,149  72.82 $12,478 49.47  0.44 
Number of individuals 12.46  56.55  6.25  39.11  0.50 
Joint        
Total benefit  $9,567  24.75 $11,548 45.78  1.21 
Number of individuals  5.18 23.51 6.01 37.61  1.16 
Single        
Total benefit  $942  2.44 $1,200 4.76  1.27 
Number of individuals  4.39 19.94 3.72 23.27  0.85 
Total        
Total benefit  $38,658  100.00 $25,226 100.00  0.65 
Number of individuals 
 
22.02 100.00 15.98 100.00  0.73 
By number of qualifying children 
 
      
Returns without a qualifying child        
Total benefit  $942  2.44 $1,285 5.09  1.36 
Number of individuals  4.39 19.94 4.19 31.97  0.95 
Returns with one qualifying child        
Total benefit  $13,746  35.56 $6,985 27.69  0.51 
Number of individuals  8.27 37.55 4.65 35.54  0.56 
Returns with more than one 
qualifying child 
      
Total benefit  $23,970  62.01 $16,956 67.22  0.71 
Number of individuals  9.36 42.51 4.26 32.49  0.45 
Total        
Total benefit  $38,658  100.00 $25,226 100.00  0.65 
Number of individuals  22.02 100.00 13.10 100.00  0.59 
Source: Author’s calculation using data from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement 2004, IRS figures 
derived using data from SOI Bulletin Fall 2006 – Individual Tax Returns 2004, Figure H (Year 2003) and the 2004 
Green Book, Table 13-13. 
 
The EITC is also targeted toward large families. The bottom panel of Table 3 reports 
total benefits received and the number of recipient families by number of children. IRS 
data indicate that families with more than one child receive most of the credit dollars, 
over 62 percent of total payments. CPS data indicate a slightly higher share of payments 
go to families with two or more children. Over 39 percent of dollars go to families with 
two children, while 29 percent of dollars go to families with three or more children. 
Overall, we can see from Table 3 that the IRS paid out USD 38.7 billion dollars under 
the EITC in 2003. 
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income 
The effect of the EITC on income distribution is among the most important effects of 
the tax credit. Hence, we provide a brief description of the distributional effects of the 
credit. One way to assess the impact of the EITC is to calculate the mean income with 
and without the EITC for different initial income ranges. For single mothers with 
income between USD 6,000 and USD 12,000, the increase in mean income is about 9.5 
percent. For single parent families with incomes between USD 12,000 and USD 20,000, 
the EITC raises mean income by approximately 16.6 percent. For other income groups 
the effects are smaller, with little discernable effect on the incomes of those with pre-tax 
income over USD 35,000. In short, the EITC goes primarily to very low income single 
parents, and it amounts to a large share of the resources this group has available to 
consume.  
A second way to gauge the distributional effects of the EITC is to ask how many 
people it raises above the poverty line or other target income levels. As shown in Table 
4, in 2004 the EITC lifted just under 1.0 million families and just under 2.0 million 
children above the poverty line. Overall, the credit lifted 3.7 million people above the 
poverty line, reducing the overall poverty rate by 14 percent, and the poverty rate 
among children by 18 percent.
3 If we believe investments in children are especially 
productive (Heckman and Masterov 2007), then the EITC is well targeted.  
While no other anti-poverty program reduces the poverty rate as much as the EITC, 
one caution is that the effects of the EITC are concentrated around the poverty line (see 
Liebman 1998). Table 4 shows that the number of families or children below other 
target levels such as 50 percent of the poverty line or 200 percent of the poverty line is 
also sharply reduced by the EITC. However, the largest effects occur at levels just under 
the poverty line: the largest percentage changes tend to be at 75 percent of the poverty 
line.  
                                                 
3 Given that the CPS imputes less than two-thirds of the dollars that the IRS has paid out (as indicated in 
Table 3), it seems likely that these numbers understate the transfers to low income families and understate the number 
of individuals raised above the poverty line by the EITC. 
8  IFAU –The US earned income tax credit, its effects, and possible reforms Table 4 Number of families, individuals, and children in poverty with and without the 
EITC, 2004 (in thousands) 












 (1)  (2)  (1)-(2)  (1)/(2) 
Families      
Below 50% of poverty line  3,949.76 3,658.88 290.87  1.08 
Below 75% of poverty line  6,179.63 5,465.16 714.47  1.13 
Below the poverty line  9,003.00 8,021.60  981.40  1.12 
Below 150% of poverty line  15,464.75 14,694.26 770.50  1.05 
Below 200% of poverty line  23,416.87 23,050.80 366.07  1.02 
Total number of families  76,866.33       
Individuals      
Below 50% of poverty line  12,380.15 11,229.57  1,150.58 1.10 
Below 75% of poverty line  20,037.61 17,103.15  2,934.46 1.17 
Below the poverty line  29,452.51 25,780.10  3,672.41 1.14 
Below 150% of poverty line  50,643.63 47,927.24  2,716.39 1.06 
Below 200% of poverty line  75,263.02 74,038.27  1,224.75 1.02 
Total no. of individuals  240,753.58       
Children under 18      
Below 50% of poverty line  5,542.75 4,885.65 657.10  1.13 
Below 75% of poverty line  8,959.68 7,324.83 1,634.85 1.22 
Below the poverty line  12,986.76 11,006.80  1,979.96 1.18 
Below 150% of poverty line  20,674.34 19,366.75  1,307.59 1.07 
Below 200% of poverty line  28,629.50 28,111.54 517.96  1.02 
Total no. of children  72,334.90       
Note: The poverty line refers to the standard measure reported by the U.S. Census Bureau. Calculations based on 
money income of families and individuals before taxes (excluding capital gains). 
Source: Figures are the author’s calculations using data from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement 
2005. All numbers are weighted. 
 
An interesting question is how the EITC compares to other policies that transfer 
income to the poor such as our main cash welfare program for single parents, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and our main broad-based program 
(similar to a negative income tax) that provides food assistance, Food Stamps. In Table 
5 we compare the analyses of Table 4 for the EITC to the corresponding ones for TANF 
and Food Stamps. As expected, these programs are more targeted at those with the very 
lowest incomes. Nevertheless, in part because TANF has shrunk in size since welfare 
reform, it has a smaller effect at all income cutoffs than the EITC. Even at half the 
poverty line, it only raises 6 percent of people over the line compared to 10 percent for 
the EITC. TANF has little effect at the poverty line, raising 2 percent of people out of 
poverty compared to 14 percent for the EITC.  
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EITC, TANF and food stamps, 2004 







(without FS/  
with FS) 
Families     
Below 50% of poverty line  1.08  1.05  1.16 
Below 75% of poverty line  1.13  1.03  1.10 
Below the poverty line  1.12  1.01  1.05 
Below 150% of poverty line  1.05  1.00  1.01 
Below 200% of poverty line  1.02  1.00  1.00 
People     
Below 50% of poverty line  1.10  1.06  1.19 
Below 75% of poverty line  1.17  1.03  1.11 
Below the poverty line  1.14  1.02  1.06 
Below 150% of poverty line  1.06  1.00  1.01 
Below 200% of poverty line  1.02  1.00  1.00 
Children under 18     
Below 50% of poverty line  1.13  1.08  1.27 
Below 75% of poverty line  1.22  1.04  1.14 
Below the poverty line  1.18  1.02  1.07 
Below 150% of poverty line  1.07  1.00  1.01 
Below 200% of poverty line  1.02  1.00  1.00 
Note: The poverty line refers to the standard measure reported by the US Census Bureau. Calculations based on 
money income of families and individuals before taxes (excluding capital gains). 
Source: Figures are the author’s calculations using data from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement 
2005. All numbers are weighted.  
 
Interestingly, Food Stamps raises 19 percent of people and 27 percent of children 
past 50 percent of the poverty line, compared to 10 and 13 percent for the EITC. 
However, Food Stamps only raises 6 percent of all people and 7 percent of children 
above the poverty line.
4 The minimum wage is a policy alternative to the EITC that has 
often been promoted as helping low wage workers. The minimum wage is much less 
well targeted than these transfer programs, with a large share going to children and 
secondary workers in well-off families (Burkhauser et al 1996; Neumark and Wascher 
2001; Hoffman and Seidman 2003; MaCurdy and McIntyre 2004). 
                                                 
4 All of the reported effects of the EITC, TANF and Food Stamps probably understate their true effects given the 
pronounced under-reporting of all of these programs in the CPS (Meyer, Mok and Sullivan 2007). 
10  IFAU –The US earned income tax credit, its effects, and possible reforms 4  The EITC and work 
I summarize the effects of the EITC on work, with a particular emphasis on single 
mothers, given the focus of the paper.
5 The EITC encourages work by making it more 
attractive to single parents. If a single parent is thinking about whether or not to 
participate in the labor market at all over a year, the EITC unequivocally makes work 
more attractive. Whatever hours level a person would choose if they worked, the gain at 
that hours level from working rather than not working has increased. Given that for 
many single mothers the net return to working is so low (weighing what is gained by 
work compared to what is lost in welfare and other benefits), a few thousand dollars can 
dramatically change the calculation in favor of working. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) 
calculated that the average net return to working, defined as after tax earnings plus the 
cash value of benefits received if a woman worked minus the cash value of benefits 
received if she did not work, was USD 7,270 in 1984. Tax changes, primarily the EITC, 
raised that net return to work by an average of USD 1,442 by 1996 (in 1996 dollars). 
The increase in incentives was especially high for the lowest-skilled single mothers, 
those likely to receive welfare benefits and who, if they work, are likely to be on the 
phase-in or plateau portions of the EITC schedule.  
Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) examine the effect of the EITC on the employment of 
single mothers using a very simple structural model. Much of the identification of labor 
supply effects in this study comes from the contrast between employment changes for 
single mothers and single women without children. For identification, the study also 
relies on differences across women by number of children, the state taxes they face, and 
the real value of the credit relative to state living costs. Other studies have found similar 
results, exploiting different sources of variation. For identification, Eissa and Liebman 
(1996) also rely on the single mother contrast with single childless women. Hotz, 
Mullin and Scholz (2005), and Grogger (2003) rely on relative changes over time in the 
EITC credit for those with two children relative to those with one. Dickert, Houser and 
Scholz (1995) and others have used estimates for a single mother population to simulate 
                                                 
5 Excellent summaries of the labor supply effects of the EITC can be found in Hotz and Scholz (2003) and Eissa and 
Hoynes (2006). 
IFAU – The US earned income tax credit, its effects, and possible reforms  11 the effects of the EITC. Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) find that the employment of 
single mothers in 1996 was 7 percentage points higher because of the EITC. The other 
papers mentioned have results that imply similar or larger estimates.  
Table 6 reports employment rates of single mothers and single childless women with 
different levels of education between 1984 and 2005. We see the largest changes in 
employment for those without a high school degree. We report these numbers so that 
one can see the variation that is behind the estimates of employment effects described 
above, though the analyses previously cited are much more sophisticated than the 
simple comparisons presented here. The largest EITC expansions began in 1990 and 
would be expected to have completed their effects by 1997 (the last large expansion was 
in 1996, but a slightly lagged effect might be expected, see Eissa and Liebman 1996; 
Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001). There are large increases in employment over this period 
for single mothers relative to single women without children. The relative changes fall 
sharply as education rises. Welfare reform accelerated in the middle of the 1990s, so 
more sophisticated methods are needed to estimate credible effects in the later years.  
Since identification in several of the papers relies on the contrast in EITC schedules 
by family size, I also report employment by number of children. The employment of 
those with two or more children changes little prior to 1994. Starting then, the 
employment of those with two or more children rises relative to those with one child. At 
this same time, the EITC schedule for those with two or more children was increased 
sharply relative to that for those with one child. Again, this pattern suggests EITC 
effects on employment.  
These patterns in Table 6 suggest that the comparison groups used in past studies 
may have been quite sensible ones. Since 1999, the employment of single mothers has 
declined. It is unclear what is behind this pattern. However, an encouraging feature of 
this pattern for past research is that the employment of those with and without children 
has moved in a parallel fashion. Similarly, the employment of single mothers with two 
or more children has fallen at about the same rate as single mothers of one child. These 
patterns support the idea that single childless women are a sensible comparison group 
for single mothers and that single mothers with different numbers of children are 
comparable.  
12  IFAU –The US earned income tax credit, its effects, and possible reforms Table 6 Employment rates of single mothers and single childless women, by education 
and family size, 1986-2006 
Year  Less than high school  
degree 
High school  
graduate 




Two +  
children 
   Mothers  Childless  Mothers  Childless Mothers Childless Mothers  Mothers 
1986  0.456 0.745 0.764 0.937 0.884 0.975 0.821 0.636 
1987  0.442 0.743 0.783 0.935 0.892 0.981 0.812 0.660 
1988  0.459 0.754 0.775 0.931 0.905 0.984 0.830 0.662 
1989  0.479 0.719 0.788 0.924 0.896 0.980 0.839 0.670 
1990  0.494 0.737 0.779 0.925 0.912 0.981 0.835 0.681 
1991  0.464 0.720 0.752 0.920 0.907 0.980 0.817 0.668 
1992  0.444 0.657 0.742 0.893 0.895 0.978 0.814 0.660 
1993  0.472 0.709 0.755 0.907 0.883 0.973 0.853 0.649 
1994  0.551 0.696 0.772 0.897 0.920 0.973 0.873 0.712 
1995  0.558 0.718 0.799 0.895 0.924 0.977 0.870 0.744 
1996  0.563 0.694 0.830 0.900 0.920 0.966 0.867 0.769 
1997  0.605 0.691 0.840 0.914 0.936 0.971 0.873 0.807 
1998  0.678 0.763 0.857 0.913 0.947 0.971 0.901 0.833 
1999  0.741 0.739 0.899 0.924 0.949 0.977 0.924 0.867 
2000  0.731 0.748 0.894 0.908 0.951 0.975 0.914 0.874 
2001  0.723 0.712 0.868 0.884 0.951 0.967 0.906 0.856 
2002  0.699 0.700 0.867 0.869 0.949 0.961 0.908 0.841 
2003  0.677 0.677 0.853 0.886 0.921 0.960 0.880 0.833 
2004  0.685 0.702 0.842 0.859 0.936 0.961 0.886 0.832 
2005  0.667 0.672 0.832 0.866 0.925 0.957 0.882 0.822 
N  14,391 10,194 29,284 30,780 30,940 76,736 36,701 37,914 
Notes: From the 1989-2006 March Current Population Surveys. See Table 1 for additional notes. 
 
The expected effects of the EITC on hours of work for single parents are 
complicated. Most recipients are on plateau or phase-out sections of the credit schedule 
reported in Figure 1.
6 On the plateau section, there is a negative income effect and no 
substitution effect since marginal rates are unaffected. On the phase-out portion, income 
and substitution effects are both negative. Thus, most people should be encouraged to 
reduce their hours because of the EITC. However, this theoretical prediction has not 
been borne out in the data analyzed to date. This lack of an “hours effect” is one of the 
more puzzling, yet robust findings in the literature (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Meyer and 
Rosenbaum 1999; Meyer 2002; Eissa and Hoynes 2006).  
                                                 
6 1994 IRS data indicate that 26.6 percent of recipients with children are on the phase-in portion of the schedule, 13.9 
are on the plateau, while 59.5 are on the phase-out portion (US General Accounting Office 1996). 
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common explanations are: 1) an inability of workers to freely vary their hours because 
of employer preferences for certain hours, 2) measurement error in hours, and 3) 
imperfect perception of marginal tax rates (Eissa and Hoynes 2006; Meyer 2002). I 
think the most plausible explanation is imperfect perception of marginal rates. It would 
not be surprising if recipients do not fully understand the tax schedule given the 
complexity of eligibility and the instructions.
7 In recent years, the instructions for the 
EITC were a very dense 13 or 14 pages. The marginal rates are not reported on the tax 
forms anywhere. This situation is unlike the base income tax rates for which marginal 
rates are reported quite clearly on the tax rate schedules. Most recipients do not fill out 
the tax forms themselves
8 and those who prepare tax returns for them do not routinely 
explain marginal rates to clients. Thus, a lack of a response to the incentive to reduce 
hours may not be too surprising. 
The expected effects of the EITC on work and hours among couples are even more 
complicated. Since it is very likely at least one parent is working, the effects have some 
similarities to the hours effects for single current recipients. The income effect always 
discourages work, and it is likely recipients will be on the phase-out region where the 
substitution effect reinforces this tendency. With couples, overall hours can be reduced 
by one of the partners leaving the work force, as well as a reduction in hours by one or 
more workers. The main evidence on this occurrence comes from Eissa and Hoynes 
(2004) and Heim (2006). Both papers find a small reduction in overall hours. While 
Eissa and Hoynes find that most of the effect comes through a reduction in participation 
by wives, Heim finds that most of the effect is on the intensive (hours) margin.  
5  The EITC and welfare caseloads 
The EITC reduces welfare receipt by making work more attractive than welfare for a 
substantial fraction of single mothers. In response to the welfare reforms of the mid-
                                                 
7 See Romich and Weisner (2000) for a discussion of worker perceptions of EITC provisions. 
8 See US General Accounting Office (1996). 
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1994 to just over 2 million by 2001. Caseloads have been roughly steady since 2001.  
Grogger (2003, 2004) identifies EITC effects in his regressions through differences 
in EITC maximum benefit amounts by the number of children. He concludes that the 
EITC was responsible for about 15 percent of the very large decline in welfare receipt in 
the 1990s. He argues that most of the reduction in welfare cases seems to be through a 
reduction in welfare entry.  
6  Problems with the EITC: Hours, marriage, 
compliance 
Three important problems with the EITC are its predicted negative effects on hours, its 
potential to discourage marriage among low income workers, and the potential for 
ineligibles to receive benefits. The first issue, hours of work, has already been discussed 
above. A concern is that even if we cannot see in the data a reduction in hours among 
single mother recipients, the theoretical prediction is sufficiently clear that we think it is 
likely to happen. If the reason that we currently do not see an hours response is that 
recipients do not currently understand the marginal incentives, then if the understanding 
of recipients improved, the situation might change and an hours reduction may emerge.  
A second concern is marriage incentives. The EITC as currently designed has 
complicated incentives for marriage. The schedule is almost the same for singles and 
couples, with the maximum benefit available to someone who earns slightly more than 
full-time work at the minimum wage (see Figure 1). Because of this structure, the EITC 
encourages marriage for some: those who have children, but with little or no earnings. 
The EITC discourages marriage for others: those with children who are working full-
time, but remain poor. On net, there are more couples and potential couples who 
increase their EITC payments by divorcing or staying unmarried than who would 
increase them by marrying or staying married. Thus, the EITC discourages marriage 
somewhat overall. Of the two most detailed studies that estimate the effects on marriage 
(Ellwood 2000; Eissa and Hoynes 2000), one finds no effect, the other little or no effect 
on marriage. Ellwood conducts two analyses: 1) he examines changes in marriage rates 
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the EITC and 2) he examines whether cohabitating couples marry, comparing those 
whose EITC amount would rise with marriage to those whose credit would fall with 
marriage. Eissa and Hoynes identify marriage effects by comparing marriage rates for a 
sample of couples that are either married or cohabitating but differ in how tax and 
welfare provisions affect their marriage incentives because their earnings differ (and 
provisions change over time).  
The final major concern about the EITC, and the one that is most popular in the 
press, is the issue of noncompliance. Noncompliance means not paying the taxes that 
are due, either intentionally or unintentionally. The IRS estimates that in 1999, about 30 
percent of credit dollars were claimed in error. The most common source of error is a 
claim where a child is not eligible, most often because the child does not reside with the 
claimant. While it is not clear that this noncompliance rate is higher than for other tax 
provisions, a disproportionate share of tax enforcement effort has been devoted to 
making sure those who receive the EITC were in fact eligible. EITC recipients have 
been subject to a very large share of audits relative to the potential lost revenue. In 
Fiscal Year 2004, the EITC accounted for 48 percent of individual income tax return 
audits, despite the EITC being only 3-4 percent of the tax gap (taxes due that were not 
collected). Even this share is probably overstated given the IRS methodology, because 
even if the filer in question is not eligible for the EITC, another person in the household 
or outside often is. In addition, a large share of cases where payments are denied are 
overturned when assistance is provided in understanding the required documentation. 
Much of noncompliance is probably driven by needless complexity – 14 pages of 
instructions in the overall tax guide, and 56 pages in the EITC instruction booklet.  
7 Optimality 
Standard models of optimal income taxation such as Mirrlees (1971) assume that people 
continuously vary their hours. In such models, tax rates are always positive so that an 
EITC would not be optimal. However, much of labor supply is the decision to work or 
not to work such as the participation of women, retirement decisions, and responses to 
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the only decision is to work or not to work. Saez (2002) considers a situation where 
individuals have both participation and hours responses. When people discontinuously 
vary their hours, i.e. the participation decision is important, then negative tax rates like 
those with an EITC may be optimal. 
Liebman (2001) analyzes the incentive and income distribution effects of changing 
the many parameters of the EITC for single taxpayers. He finds that a schedule close to 
the current one is optimal for plausible relative weights put on efficiency and equity 
concerns. These analyses by Saez and Liebman suggest that there is a significant 
theoretical justification for a policy like the current US EITC. I should mention, though, 
that studies of alternative policies that assume that policy makers can collect 
information on hours (and wages) suggest that such policies are better targeted and have 
fewer distortions than an EITC (see MaCurdy and McIntyre 2004, for example). 
8 EITC  reform 
Many types of reforms to the EITC have been proposed (see Hoffman and Seidman 
2003). Common types of reforms include: 1) providing a more generous EITC for 3-
child families; 2) modifications to the tax schedule to reduce marriage penalties; 3) 
simplifying eligibility criteria for the credit; and 4) providing a more generous credit for 
single childless individuals or non-custodial fathers. I consider these possibilities in 
turn. 
The current federal EITC has a more generous schedule for families with at least two 
children than for families with one child. Cash welfare (TANF), food assistance (Food 
Stamps) and housing assistance all rise with family size beyond a second child.  
Currently, the state of Wisconsin has a supplement to the federal EITC that increases 
with each child up to three. Several authors (including Hoffman and Seidman) have 
argued for a higher schedule for families with three or more children. Larger families 
need greater resources to have the same standard of living, yet larger families tend to 
have fewer resources. Table 7 reports percentiles of the income distribution for single 
mother headed families with different numbers of children. At the 5
th and 10
th 
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one or two, while at all higher percentiles they have lower income. A more generous 
subsidy for these larger families can be achieved in at least two ways. One alternative 
would provide a higher subsidy rate than that for 2-child families. A second alternative 
would apply the same subsidy rate over a longer phase-in range for larger families. The 
first alternative would be more targeted at those with the lowest incomes, while the 
second would reach a larger number of families. 
Table 7 Percentiles of single mothers’ annual income, by number of children, 2001-
2003, Consumer Expenditure Survey 
  Single mothers  
with one child 
Single mothers  
with two children 
Single mothers with 
three or more children 
Income percentiles  (1)  (2)  (3) 




























































N 1,547  1,536  982 
Notes:  Dollar figures are expressed in year 2000 dollars. The bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses are 
corrected for within family dependence. 
 
A second area for reform that politicians and academics have discussed is the 
reduction of marriage penalties. Again, there are several ways one can reduce marriage 
penalties. One could change the married credit to be always twice the credit for single 
parents, but that would be very expensive. Other alternatives that balance increased 
costs and penalty reductions have been considered by Holtzblatt and Rebelein (2001). 
One can extend the plateau of the schedule or lower phase-out tax rates and thus extend 
the phase-out range for couples. Alternatively, one can add a second earner deduction, 
which would reduce the amount of income subject to income tax for families with two 
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This last option is inexpensive relative to the alternatives as nearly all of the lost 
revenue goes toward reducing marriage penalties, but it would require another 
worksheet to be added to the tax forms (Holtzblatt and Rebelein 2001).  
There are many ways the EITC could be simplified. While also true of other income 
tax provisions besides the EITC, the rules and instructions are extraordinarily 
complicated. As already mentioned, the main instruction booklet includes 14 very dense 
pages on the EITC and the dedicated booklet on the EITC is 56 pages long. Much of the 
complication with the EITC is the determination of who is a child for EITC purposes. 
Current tax law has several definitions of a child that apply to different tax credits. A 
clear simplification proposed by the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform 
(2005) would use the same definition of a child for the EITC, the Child Tax Credit, and 
the determination of dependents (per child deduction from income). One could also 
consider combining these three tax reductions for those with children. Such a proposal 
is a much greater change in the overall shape of the tax schedule and is a more 
expensive change but has been proposed by others (Ellwood and Liebman 2001).  
Finally, recent proposals have circulated to provide an expanded EITC for the 
childless. Such an approach necessarily increases marriage penalties somewhat since it 
increases credits for the non-married. An interesting variant on this idea was recently 
implemented in New York State and now provides a state supplement to the federal 
EITC for non-custodial parents who are up to date in their child support obligations. 
Such changes are not likely to have as big an effect on labor supply per dollar 
transferred as the current single mother focused EITC, given that most men work and 
labor force participation rates of childless women are fairly high. An expanded EITC for 
the childless would, however, provide a way to transfer income to another segment of 
the poor without significantly discouraging work.  
9 Conclusions   
In summary, the evidence indicates that the income distribution features of the EITC are 
quite good. It targets resources at those below the poverty line, particularly families 
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incentives of the EITC are remarkably favorable given the resources transferred. 
However, there are still substantial opportunities for reform along several 
dimensions. 
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Comment by Ann-Sofie Kolm
* 
This paper discusses in a very balanced way the effects of the US Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) on labor supply, poverty and income distribution. Considering the 
author’s own very careful work on the effects of the EITC, it is difficult to find a person 
more suited for this task than Bruce Meyer. Thus, it has been a pure pleasure to read this 
paper.  
The expansions of the EITC in the US have provided researchers with extensive 
opportunities to evaluate the effects of the program. Although different time periods 
have been studied and different empirical methods and identifying strategies have been 
used, the results are rather robust. The EITC seems to stimulate labor supply and reduce 
poverty. Moreover, the potentially negative effects from the EITC on, for example, 
work hours of those already working, and participation among the second income 
earners in the family, seem to be a non issue.  
Considering the rather strong empirical support for the EITC, it comes as no surprise 
that this type of policy has become increasingly popular as a means to reduce poverty 
and improve work incentives across the western world. The UK followed the US more 
than 25 years ago and implemented a version of tax reliefs conditioned on work. Other 
countries that have recently followed the US and UK are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Ireland, The Netherlands, New Zealand and, in fact, since a year ago, 
also Sweden.  
Taking a Swedish perspective, I guess it would be fair to say that Sweden both has a 
different aim with such a reform and different preconditions for how well such a reform 
would function in comparison to the US. The aim of reducing poverty is less of an issue 
in Sweden, although decision makers certainly care about the income distribution. 
Affecting work incentives is more of an argument in favor of an EITC-type of policy in 
Sweden.  
This view is also supported by a study by Boone and Bovenberg (2006) which shows 
that the relationship between in-work benefits and welfare payment is U-shaped. 
Generous in-work benefits are called for both in countries with low welfare benefits and 
 
* Ann-Sofie Kolm is Associate Professor at the Department of Economics, Stockholm University.  in countries with high welfare benefits, although for different reasons. In countries such 
as the US, where the social benefits are low and the incentives to work are fairly good, 
the EITC aims at alleviating poverty. Many countries in Europe, on the other hand, deal 
with poverty through generous social benefits. Generous social benefits, however, 
create disincentives to work which induces a demand for implementing an EITC-type of 
policy in order to maintain work incentives.  
I mainly want to stress three things in this comment on the US. Earned Income Tax 
Credit. First, the expansion of the EITC in the US makes it increasingly important to 
account for the general equilibrium effects in order to trace out the employment effect 
of the program. Thus, a better understanding of the wage adjustments is needed in order 
to evaluate the full effects of the EITC in comparison to that of alternative policies. 
Second, in order to analyze the likely effect on an EITC-type of policy in a less market 
oriented country such as Sweden, it is important to account for the country’s particular 
institutional settings. A valid question to ask is if we can expect such a reform to be 
equally successful when implemented in Sweden and other less market oriented 
economies as it has been in the US. After all, the institutional framework is far from the 
same in Sweden and the US. Finally, I would like to draw a parallel to a different type 
of policy which has a long history in Sweden, namely subsidized day care. 
Institutional differences 
Two potentially important aspects of the Swedish institutional framework when 
considering the effects of an EITC-type of policy are the compressed wage distribution 
and the imperfectly competitive labor market. 
The fact that Sweden has a compressed wage distribution is often viewed as 
problematic for any design of an EITC-type of policy that involves a phase-out region. 
With a compressed wage distribution, many people will be located in the phase-out 
region of the credit schedule. This is a concern as the phase-out of the tax credit is 
associated with negative incentive effects on work hours.
1 
                                                 
1 Here, one can note that the recently implemented tax credit in Sweden is not being phased out. Negative incentive 
effects due to the substitution effect in the phase-out region are thus not a problem. However, the negative incentive 
effects due to the income effect remain. 
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optimal in-work benefits suggests that countries with a wider income distribution have 
more to gain from in-work benefits. The reason is that the efficiency loss for a given 
improvement in the redistribution is higher when wages are compressed.  
Considering the particular Swedish institutional framework, it might be even more 
important that the Swedish labor market can be viewed as less market oriented than the 
US labor market. Wages are set in bargains where workers or worker representatives 
have the power to push for high wages. This makes involuntary unemployment a 
concern in Sweden. Considering that the impact of an EITC-type of policy will be likely 
to have different effects on employment in countries like Sweden and the US due to 
institutional differences, accounting for those differences in an analysis seems 
important.  
Expected effects of an EITC-type of policy in Sweden 
Since no EITC-type of policy in a less market oriented setting such as Sweden has been 
in place long enough to make empirical evaluations possible, one must rely on 
theoretical models and simulations to trace out the likely effects. Let us take a very 
simple model featuring involuntary unemployment as an outcome variable such as the 
standard search and matching model of Pissarides (see Pissarides 2000). Then, account 
both for an endogenous choice of labor force participation (as that has turned out to be a 
very important margin) and an endogenous search effort among the unemployed. 
Moreover, assume that wages are set in wage bargains, and that firms will open 
vacancies as long as it is profitable to do so.  
It is then straightforward to trace out the general equilibrium effects of a tax credit on 
wages, unemployment, search effort, labor force participation, and employment. In such 
a simple framework, it can be shown that the effect of a tax credit conditioned on work 
is likely to increase search effort, labor force participation and employment, while 
reducing wages and the unemployment rate. The effects, however, do not mainly work 
through increased incentives to work because the take home pay increases. Rather, the 
effect works through job creation. In fact, this simple framework can easily be used to 
show that the take home pay may actually fall with the reform due to rather strong wage 
moderation. However, the shorter expected unemployment spells due to more vacancies 
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effort. Thus, employment increases both because labor force participation increases and 
because the equilibrium unemployment rate falls. See Kolm and Tonin (2006) for 
details. 
A tax credit conditioned on work is thus likely to be good for employment also in an 
imperfectly competitive labor market setting where wages are allowed to respond to 
policy changes, although for different reasons than what is usually stressed in the 
literature. The traditional story is that employment increases as labor supply increases 
with a higher take-home pay. One could potentially argue that the labor supply story 
may be more accurate in the US economy where the EITC is targeted to low income 
earners where the minimum wage operates. This may stop the gross wage from falling, 
thus inducing the take home pay to increase and consequently reward work in terms of a 
higher consumer wage.  
Child care subsidy as in-work benefit? 
I finally want to end this comment with a parallel to a different type of policy which has 
had a long history in Sweden. It is true that Sweden only recently implemented a tax 
credit conditioned on work. However, what about viewing the Swedish child care 
subsidy as an in-work benefit? The child care subsidy in Sweden resembles the US 
system of EITC in a number of ways. First, it is an in-work benefit as it is conditioned 
on work (recently, in 2002, unemployed got limited access to subsidized child care). 
Second, it is directed towards families with children (although in the Swedish case, 
small children). Third, it is more generous to families with more children. Fourth, it is 
based on family income rather than individual income (which is unusual for the 
Swedish tax and transfer systems). It is also more generous towards single mothers 
(however, this is only symbolic as the differences are very small). There are clearly also 
differences between the Swedish child care subsidy scheme and the US EITC system. 
Most importantly, the Swedish childcare subsidy is in kind as it can only be used for 
child-care service consumption. However, it is very generous. The subsidy is about SEK 
90,000 (USD 12,800) a year/child. This adds up to total payments of SEK 34 billion 
(USD 4.8 billion), which constitutes about 1.3 percent of GDP in Sweden. To get a 
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in the US. 
It is difficult to empirically evaluate the impact of subsidized child care on, in 
particular, female employment. Many things happened at the same time as the child care 
subsidy was introduced. But in my view, child care subsidies have most likely had a 
large impact on female labor supply.  
Conclusions 
Considering some of the particular Swedish institutional settings and earlier programs 
of similar type, there are thus reasons to believe that an EITC-type of policy will be 
good for employment also in a country like Sweden. However, it may be difficult to 
empirically evaluate the effects of the reform in the future since no consideration of how 
to evaluate the reform was taken at the time of implementation. 
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